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Abstract 
This paper ĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƚŽƉ-down theory of  “accumulation by 
dispossession ? in the everyday lives of people and places with specific focus on the role of 
law. It does this by drawing upon the lived experiences of residents on a public housing 
estate in England (UK) undergoing regeneration and gentrification through the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI). 
Design/methodology/approach ʹ Members of the residents association on the Myatts Field 
North estate, London, were engaged as action research partners, working with the 
researchers to collect empirical data through surveys of their neighbours, organising 
community events and being formally interviewed themselves. Their experiential knowledge 
was supplemented with an extensive review of all associated policy, planning, legal and 
contractual documentation, some of which was disclosed in response to requests made 
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.  
Findings ʹ Three specific forms of place-based dispossession were identified: the loss of 
consumer rights; the forcible acquisition of homes; and the erasure of place identity through 
ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞďƌĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?Layard ?Ɛ (2010) concept of the  “law of place ? was shown to be 
broadly applicable in capturing how legal frameworks assist in enacting accumulation by 
dispossession ŝŶ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ ? ƋƵĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂƐ Ă
discursive practice that ultimately undermines resistance to apparent injustices.  
Originality/value ʹ This artiĐůĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐ,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶďǇĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ
in conversation with legal geography scholarship. It shows  W via the Myatts Field North 
estate case study  W how PFI, as a mechanism of accumulation by dispossession in the 
abstract, enacts dispossession in the concrete, assisted by the place-making and ideological 
power of law.  
 
Article classification: Research paper. 
 
Keywords: Urban regeneration, gentrification, dispossession, finance, law of place, Private 
Finance Initiative, public housing 
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1. Introduction 
In Western legal frameworks, dispossession is narrowly defined as the deprivation or 
eviction from rightful possession of property or land  ?ƐĞĞ &Žǆ K ?DĂŚŽŶǇ ĂŶĚ ^ǁĞĞŶĞǇ ?
2011). Yet land, law, and dispossession have a far more complex historical geographical 
relationship traversing colonial and contemporary time and space (see Fay and James, 
2009). Critical scholarship has helped to denaturalise property rights and law, unsettling 
previous assumptions of how land came to be legally owned in the first place and by whom 
(Blomley, 2004; Wily, 2012). Such alternative meanings and histories of dispossession are 
embodied in the socio-spatial transformations ŽĨ “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?DĂƌǆ ? ? ? ?6) that 
gave birth to capitalist social relations. These processes were prevalent in the colonial 
 “ƉŝůůĂŐĞ ?ŽĨthe territories and peoples of the Global South throughout more than 500 years 
(see Galeano, 1973), and the removal of ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽƐƵďƐŝƐƚĨƌŽŵ
the commons during the countryside enclosures in Britain and other European societies 
throughout the same period (see Neeson, 1996). Crucially, these territorial appropriations 
around the world are synonymous with what Blomley (2003, p.130) calls  “ůĞŐĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?in 
which the imposition of maps and property laws  W often through state-sponsored force  W 
played essential roles in naturalising and protecting ƚŚĞŶĞǁŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?ůĞŐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽůĂŶĚand 
resources they had expropriated (Harris, 2004; Wightman, 2013).  
Dispossession is currently attracting renewed academic attention, most notably 
through David ,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?Ɛ theoretical re-working of primitive accumulation as  “ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ďǇĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? (Harvey, 2003, p.145). Harvey (2010, p.45) argues that since 1973, global 
capitalism has been engulfed in an ongoing crisis of  “ŽǀĞƌĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?in which surpluses 
of capital are unable to find enough outlets to make profit. Old and new mechanisms of 
dispossession  W led by the privatisation of state industries and assets  W have thus been 
pushed to the forefront of state-corporate growth strategies so as to release public or 
common assets and resources into the market  “where overaccumulating capital [can] invest 
ŝŶƚŚĞŵ ?ƵƉŐƌĂĚĞƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŵ ? ?Harvey, 2003, p.158). Viewed against the 
background of nearly four decades of neoliberal policies in diverse national settings, 
,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?Ɛ thesis is highly persuasive and lent extra credibility by the new round of state sell-
offs and restructuring under austerity programmes in North America and Europe following 
the 2008 financial crisis (see Kitson et al, 2012). Yet Harvey has also attracted valid criticism 
particularly within a diverse Marxist scholarship for, inter alia, his contingent reading of 
continuous historical processes of dispossession (Glassman, 2009), weaknesses in his wider 
theory of overaccumulating capital (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006), and his under-
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ĚĞĞƉůǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ŽƌĐŚĞƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? (Levien, 
2013, p.382).  
While such debates fall beyond the remit here, this article responds to a more 
general critique of contemporary dispossession theories as top-down abstractions that lack 
historical-geographical specificity of how dispossession plays out and is experienced by 
people on the ground (Hart, 2006). Alongside a growing number of studies attempting to 
ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞ ,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝŶ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ? ǁe have elsewhere sought to 
territorialise and urbanise contemporary processes of accumulation by dispossession as 
 “ŶĞǁƵƌďĂŶĞŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚan analysis of UK neoliberal policies towards housing and 
regeneration (Hodkinson, 2012). But there are two substantive weaknesses in this emergent 
research. First, there remains little sense of how the theorised predations of accumulation 
materialise on the ground as forms and experiences of dispossession in the everyday places 
and lives of ordinary people  W how have they experienced dispossession? Second, despite 
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the importance of legal geographical power to historical acts of dispossession, there is a lack 
of research into how current processes of accumulation by dispossession are actually 
mobilised in places and on people through law and legal practices.  
To this end, legal geographical scholarship provides important conceptual tools for 
understanding the place-based dynamics of dispossession. For example, Blomley ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?
2008) interpretation of anti-ŐĞŶƚƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐŝŶsĂŶĐŽƵǀĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƚŽǁŶĂƐƚƐŝĚĞĂƐĂ
battle to defend the neighbourhood ?Ɛcommons from enclosure involves rejecting dominant 
liberal public/private conceptions of individual property rights and instead seeing 
dispossession in  “ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉŽƐĞĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƐĐŽƉĞ ? ?ůŽŵůĞǇ ? ? ? ?, 
p.316). Layard ?Ɛ (2010) concept of  “ĂůĂǁŽĨƉůĂĐĞ ?, based on a retail development in Bristol, 
is an equally useful frame for understanding how national and local scale legal mechanisms 
such as planning and compulsory purchase law operate to transform  “multiple 
heterogeneous city centre spaces into a single homogeneous and commodified privately 
ŽǁŶĞĚ ƌĞƚĂŝů ƐŝƚĞ ? for the purpose of commercial gain (ibid., p.412). However, neither 
Blomley nor >ĂǇĂƌĚ ?Ɛwork has been explicitly connected to the debates on accumulation by 
dispossession.  
This article addresses the continuing challenge of dispossession from above to below 
by drawing on findings from an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded study 
of public housing regeneration in England, UK, delivered through the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). While PFI is typically analysed from a critical accountancy perspective (Shaoul 
et al., 2010), we are interested in ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? “ůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? of PFI as both place-based 
dwellers and public service users for whom the governance of their homes and services is 
being transformed. Our empirical focus is on the 25 year PFI regeneration of Myatts Field 
North (MFN) housing estate in the London Borough of Lambeth that began in 2012. A group 
of MFN residents were engaged as action research partners and they collected empirical 
data through conducting surveys of their neighbours and organising community drop-ins 
and public meetings. This was supplemented with an exhaustive analysis of local authority 
reports, published parts of the final PFI contract, and project documentation disclosed 
following a Freedom of Information Act 2000 request.  
A first section briefly discusses how PFI, housing privatisation and gentrification-
based urban regeneration function in the Harvey schema as forms of accumulation by 
dispossession from above. A second section territorialises these policies by introducing the 
MFN estate, explaining the rationale for regeneration and documenting the highly complex 
and fluctuating PFI procurement between 2004 and 2012. A third section then examines 
how the financial prerogatives of PFI have generated three particular forms of place-based 
dispossession  W of ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?consumer rights, of precarious ŚŽŵĞŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?property rights 
and of the wider commƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛexisting neighbourhood identity. A fourth section offers some 
brief reflections on the role of law and legal geography in assembling dispossession on MFN. 
We conclude that while >ĂǇĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) “ůĂǁŽĨƉůĂĐĞ ?accurately conveys the indispensable 
role of formal legal frameworks in enacting resource redistribution to finance capital under 
PFI, our study also reveals the importance of potentially unlawful acts in PFI place-making, 
underlining the continuing historical role of law as a discursive practice of ideological power 
ŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐ (Blomley, 2003).  
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2. Dispossession from above: urban regeneration under the Private Finance 
Initiative in the UK 
In David ,ĂƌǀĞǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )thesis, accumulation by dispossession is portrayed as taking place 
through the top-down imposition of neoliberal policies. ƐǁĞůůĂƐ ƚŚĞ  “ƉƌĞĚĂƚŽƌǇ ?ƌŽůĞŽĨ
finance capital, such mechanisms include the  “rolling back of regulatory frameworks 
designed to protect labour and the envŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ƌĞǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ
ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐƚĂƚĞƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ƚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?,ĂƌǀĞǇ ? ? ? ? ?, 
p. ? ? ? ) ?Ƶƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽƉƵďůŝĐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?(ibid) that 
ĨŽƌ,ĂƌǀĞǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ “ĐƵƚƚŝŶŐĞĚŐĞ ?(ibid) of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession 
in advanced capitalist societies. In this section, we briefly discuss how PFI-based public 
housing regeneration schemes in England can be understood as a form of accumulation by 
dispossession from above.  
Space does not permit an exhaustive account of UK housing privatisation since 1979 
but the main storylines are now well known. Under Thatcherism, millions of publicly-rented 
 “ĐŽƵŶĐŝůhomes ? were sold off at large discounts to sitting tenants through the 1980 Right to 
Buy policy. Direct sales to tenants were supplemented after the late 1980s with the 
privatisation of individual housing estates and entire local authority housing stocks to 
housing associations or Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) (Murie, 1993). Alongside disposal 
was a deliberate policy of residualisation (Cole and Furbey, 1994) through which subsidies 
for new public house building were gradually reduced and switched to the increasingly 
commercialised RSL sector, and repair and maintenance budgets also substantially cut, 
leaving an estimated £19 billion disrepair backlog for all social housing by 1997.  
/ŶƚŚŝƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůǁĂǀĞŽĨ “ƌŽůů-ďĂĐŬŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?WĞĐŬĂŶĚdŝĐŬĞůů ?2002, p.384), capital 
accumulation was boosted through unlocking state housing, finance and land to private and 
commercial interests without direct dispossession  W neither the Right to Buy nor the transfer 
of council-ŽǁŶĞĚ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚ ůŽƐŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŚŽŵĞ ?
Rather, housing privatisation created new outlets for surplus finance capital to profit from 
land rents previously denied from public ownership. It took place alongside a wider 
neoliberal urban agenda of encouraging mainly speculative investment in narrow real estate 
developments on prime city centre sites through the imposition in some cities of US-style 
Urban Development Corporations, which had sweeping powers to gentrify empty or derelict 
spaces for business and private residential use and attract inward (foreign) investment 
(Boyle, 1989). Against a background of economic recession, monetary crisis and large fiscal 
deficit, by the early 1990s, this wider privatisation by disposal of public assets and services 
had evolved into  “ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶďǇ ƐƚĞĂůƚŚ ? (Whitfield, 2001, p.92) through the creation of 
public-private partnerships, most notably the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  
Launched in 1992, PFI was officially framed as a necessary innovation to address 
longstanding under-investment in state infrastructure without officially increasing public 
sector borrowing and debt (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999). PFI did this by creating a new 
ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ŵŽĚĞů ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?
build, and operation of new public infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, schools, roads and prisons) 
was outsourced to private sector consortia comprised of developers, facilities management 
firms and international banks in long-term contracts lasting between 15 and 60 years. PFI 
consortia provide the upfront capital financing for the initial construction phase, usually 
through a combination of commercial borrowing and equity investment, whilst receiving a 
ŵŽŶƚŚůǇƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ?ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ “hŶŝƚĂƌǇŚĂƌŐĞ ? )ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌĐůŝĞŶƚƉĂƌƚůǇĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĚ
by central government subsidy  ? “W&/ ĐƌĞĚŝƚƐ ) ĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ W&/ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĐŽƐƚƐ ?
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Through this financial-legal apparatus, asset risk could be transferred to the private sector, 
which enabled PFI projects to be placed  “off-balance-sheet ? with only the annual service 
payments appearing in the public accounts, not the total investment (debt) in the years it 
actually took place.  
Despite the proven higher cost of privately-financing public infrastructure as 
opposed to direct state borrowing (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2011), 
PFI was justified as offering better  “ǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌŵŽŶĞǇ ?ŽǀĞƌĂůůďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ
apparent  “superior ? management of risk (HM Treasury, 2000). There are currently 725 PFI 
schemes operating across the UK public sector amounting to at least £305.3bn in committed 
public spending between 1990 and 2050 (HM Treasury, 2013). Academic research suggests 
that, overall, PFI has been extremely poor value for money (see Ismail, 2011, for an 
exhaustive review). But as Kerr (1998, p.2282) argued in a highly prescient critique, judging 
PFI on its own merits misses its real purpose as a neoliberal technology designed to 
 “ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůŽŐŝĐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ďƵƚ ŝŶ Ă ǁĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ
ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂů ? ?Drawing on the forensic research of Whitfield (2001, 
2010), PFI has worked in the following ways as a form of accumulation by dispossession 
from above: 
 
(i) By replacing direct government borrowing with far more expensive commercial 
financing ultimately paid for by the state, opening up more profitable lending and 
investing opportunities for finance capital that include a lucrative secondary market 
for trading PFI equity stakes; 
(ii) By commercialising public services that politically could not be sold-off as complete 
services by redefining a public service as something that could  “ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐůǇ
financed but ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐ ? (Whitfield, 2001, 
p.196); 
(iii) By enabling capital to commercially exploit a guaranteed public sector market, 
financed and underwritten by the state, and thus avoid the risk of speculatively 
investing to create a private sector market for its own product; 
(iv) By generating  “ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŐĂƉƐ ? ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ƉůĂŶƐ through costly 
delays in the procurement process, gaps that have been subsequently plugged by 
depleting other public sector budgets or by gifting land to offer profitable revenue-
generating opportunities for PFI consortia (see Shaoul, 2005); 
(v) By facilitating systematic corporate tax avoidance with many PFI schemes owned by 
offshore companies that pay no tax on their profits to the UK government (Costello, 
2012).  
 
W&/ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚin public housing can be traced back to the late 1990s, by which time 
Thatcherite housing privatisation had been transformed into a wider urban regeneration 
strategy under New Labour ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇŝƚƐ “ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐĞƐďĂĐŬƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ? ?ĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ, 2008, p.2387). This was a policy motivated  W at least in official discourse 
(Lees, 2008)  W by a belief in the social and economic benefits of tenure mixing and  “ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ
ŐĞŶƚƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ?, p.2367). Yet it was ultimately predicated on state 
intervention to enable finance capital to profit from exploiting large  “rent gaps ?(Smith, 
1979) in urban areas i.e. the surplus value unlocked by rising land values and rent yields 
after redevelopment. ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƐĞĐŽŶĚ “ƌŽůů-ŽƵƚ ?ƉŚĂƐĞŽĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ (Peck and Tickell, 
2002, p.384), therefore, more direct forms of dispossession have been present such as the 
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displacement of people from their homes and communities to enable demolition of 
apparently  “obsolete ? public and private working class housing and create vacant land for 
speculative private residential development aimed at middle class consumption (Allen, 
2008).  
A key housing policy plank of these processes was >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐDecent Homes 
programme that set out policies and investment paths to ensure that by 2010 all social 
tenants (whether local authority or RSL) in England lived ŝŶ Ă  “ĚĞĐĞŶƚ ŚŽŵĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŵĞƚ 
minimum housing standards. Rather than a break with the previous housing privatisation 
framework, Decent Homes investment was made conditional on reforms aimed at 
increasing the role of the private sector and market forces in the provision of social rented 
housing. In general, local authorities were offered either additional state subsidies to 
transfer their housing stock to commercial housing associations or increased borrowing 
powers if they set up their own  “arms-length management organisations ? (ALMOs) to run 
the day-to-day management of services and investment on a more commercialised basis 
(Whitfield, 2003). PFI was made available to a small number of English local authorities 
between 1998 and 2010 as a ƚŚŝƌĚ ?  “niche ? investment option for meeting the decency 
target but as part of a more comprehensive regeneration of specific housing estates or 
stocks (Hodkinson, 2011a). The £4.4 billion publicly-funded programme  W now closed  W has 
37 social housing PFI schemes ranging from intensive refurbishment to estate-wide 
regeneration encompassing demolition, new housing, and improved environments and 
facilities.  
So, in abstract terms, we can see how accumulation through dispossession has been 
rolled out through housing privatisation and PFI, opening up the provision of public housing 
infrastructure, services and neighbourhoods for commercial exploitation. But how do these 
dynamics of dispossession emerge and become territorialised on the ground in ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
lives? We now explore these questions through a case study of a specific housing PFI 
regeneration scheme in central London.  
 
3. Territorialising Dispossession: the Myatts Field North PFI scheme in London 
MFN is a public housing estate sited one mile north east of Brixton Town in the London 
Borough of Lambeth.
1
 It was built by the local authority during the mid-1970s as part of the 
ĂƌĞĂ ?Ɛredevelopment following slum clearance. Comprised of approximately 500 council 
homes in a relatively low rise and innovative architectural design, MFN from the outset was 
a racially mixed residential working class community  W today, over 50% of residents identify 
as black (Lambeth, 2012). By the early 1990s, the MFN estate had become engulfed in the 
physical and social neglect familiar to many council estates after the neoliberal roll-back of 
investment under Thatcherism. MFN was additionally embroiled in wider issues of gang 
crime associated with Brixton (Mavrommatis, 2010). Interviews with established residents 
confirm the severity of the social and physical problems they faced on a daily basis, but also 
revealed a desire to distance their accounts from the stigmatising discourse of  “ŶŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐ
ƉůĂĐĞƐ ? (Kearns et al., 2013) regularly used by local authorities when seeking regeneration 
funding. Alongside the  “ŐĂŶŐƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶa strong and active community, 
reflected in resident-led community projects, a Tenant Management Organisation 
previously in charge of estate management and maintenance, the 100 tenants who bought 
                                            
1
 Much of the background data for this case study comes from a large number of local authority reports and 
project documents that are too numerous to cite here.  A full reference list will be made available on 
www.housingpfi.org.uk  
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their council homes and stayed on the estate, and a 2003 survey that found almost two-
thirds of residents would want to remain on a redeveloped MFN (Lambeth, 2006a).  
With previous investment schemes during the 1990s and early 2000s hampered by 
rising costs and financial and planning constraints, in 2004 the government accepted 
>ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐive redevelopment of the estate under PFI, including 
demolition and replacement of approximately 300 homes left unimproved by previous 
schemes. Despite W&/ ?Ɛemerging problems and political opposition to it, the Labour-
controlled council was attracted by the government subsidy not least because it promised 
to finance the regeneration without the need for a large financial cross-subsidy from high-
density private development and the loss of open space previously rejected by residents 
and planning officials. By mid-2006, the PFI scheme had been approved  W if not 
enthusiastically  W in a ballot of local residents amid a vocal anti-privatisation lobby. 172 
homes would be retained and refurbished to above the  “Decenƚ,ŽŵĞƐ ?standard with the 
remaining 305 homes (including 58 owner-occupied) to be demolished and re-provided on a 
 “like for like ? basis to facilitate  “as many existing leaseholders rehoused who wish to remain 
as part of the aim to retain a cohesive community ?(Lambeth, 2005, p.65). The scheme also 
included a redesigned park, a new community centre, and following the 2007 intervention 
of the Mayor of London, a new Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHP) to provide hot water, 
central heating and electricity to homes. Works would take place in an intensive 5 year build 
programme. 
To finance the scheme, the government agreed to provide £114.6 million in  “PFI 
credits ? to cover the capital investment costs over a planned 30 year contract while the 
local authority would use its existing income from tenants and leaseholders rents to pay the 
W&/ ĐŽŶƐŽƌƚŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ĚĂǇ-to-day management and maintenance costs (Lambeth, 2006b). 
Nevertheless, the estimated £14 million cost of acquiring 58 former council homes bought 
under the Right to Buy  W which included compensation at market value, plus 10% home-loss 
compensation, and other disturbance costs payable under Compulsory Purchase legislation 
 W could not be financed from PFI credits. Lambeth thus needed to generate this additional 
finance by creating and releasing  “value ? ĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐůĂŶĚĞŶǀĞůŽƉĞ. Hence one 
of >ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?Ɛmain reasons for spatial restructuring of the existing built environment via 
demolition and redevelopment was to ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇĞǆƉůŽŝƚ “ƌĞŶƚŐĂƉƐ ?(Smith, 1979, p.545) by 
unlocking and selling public land parcels for private housing development and seeking a 
share  ? “ŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? Žƌ  “ĐůĂǁ ďĂĐŬ ? ) of any profits made from subsequent private property 
sales (Lambeth, 2005, p.76). At this stage, 187 new private 1 and 2 bedroom flats for sale 
would be built, generating the finance needed to buy out the homeowners.  
 After a succession of delays, including the arresting impact of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, in December 2009 the Regenter Myatts Field North Limited consortium  W a 
joint venture between John Laing PLC and Pinnacle Regeneration Group  W was confirmed as 
the loĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?Ɛpreferred bidder for the MFN scheme.2 ZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛwinning bid involved 
a guaranteed minimum £8 million payment to Lambeth to reflect disposal value of the 
development land on 125 year leases, as well as a share of both expected and windfall 
profits realised from the sale of new private homes (Lambeth, 2011, p.46). In return, 
Regenter had been allowed to double the amount of private residential development 
originally permitted ďǇ>ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?ƐŽǁŶ  ? ? ? ?Outline Planning Application in to 398 homes 
                                            
2
 ZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƐƵď-contractors are: Pinnacle PSG, who manage estate and housing services; Rydon, who 
oversee refurbishment and maintenance; Higgins, responsible for building new housing and facilities; and 
E.ON, providing ĨŽƌƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŵĂŝŶenergy needs. 
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(including 41 for shared ownership), in exchange for also delivering 105 new social rented 
homes, part-financed with public subsidy, through the Notting Hill Housing Association 
(Greater London Authority, 2010). The 58 homeowners would now be offered a choice 
between selling back their homes to Lambeth for market value plus 10% homeloss 
compensation in line with Compulsory Purchase legislation, or moving into a  “like for like ? 
(bedroom size and tenure) new home on the estate that involved simply swapping their 
existing lease or deeds for new ones, at no cost to them. Any like for like property not taken 
up by an existing homeowner ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ƐŽůĚďǇZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŽŶ ƚŚĞ
open market (n.b. the financial arrangement for sharing any profits from such sales with 
Lambeth remains undisclosed).  
 The May 2010 election of the UK Coalition Government led to a further delay after 
the Treasury launched a  “value for money ? review of PFI schemes that translated into a £16 
million reduction in subsidy for the MFN scheme. This state-imposed affordability gap had 
to be plugged through cost-saving measures, including: a reduced contract length from 30 
to 25 years; a four instead of five year demolition and construction period (requiring up to 
69 households to be housed in temporary accommodation); a reduction in housing office 
hours; and removal of an estate improvement fund. In other words, the public sector client 
and MFN residents would get less services for the same money. Significantly for the focus 
here, Lambeth would no longer receive any of the promised £8 million for the sale of 
development sites (which appear to have been gifted to Regenter) in return for a £2.7 
million reduction in the overall cost of the contract (Lambeth, 2011, pp.46-7). Moreover, 
Lambeth had again permitted an increase in the number of private homes to be developed, 
from 398 to 503, which included a greater number of  “affordable ? shared ownership homes 
(41 to 105) but at the expense of the 105 social rented homes, which were now removed 
after government subsidy cuts (ibid).  
The MFN PFI regeneration scheme finally began in May 2012, five years later than 
originally planned, and with a much higher density of private residential development than 
initially anticipated. We now explore in more depth how these financial complexities of PFI 
procurement have materialised in specific forms of place-based dispossession MFN 
residents lives. 
 
4. Dispossession on the ground: divestment of rights, property and 
community identity 
Chiming with previous critical research on housing PFI (Hodkinson, 2011a, b), in the first two 
and half years of the contract, residents have experienced problems across every aspect of 
the scheme. This has led to several petitions, angry public meetings, a huge rise in official 
complaints by residents, contractors being refused access to ƐŽŵĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? homes, a 
demonstration to the town hall that gained national media coverage and the election of the 
residents ? association chair and vocal PFI critic as a popular local councillor. Community 
dissatisfaction stems mainly from the perceived poor quality of construction and 
refurbishment work, and the failure of key housing services (see Dyer et al, 2014, for 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? ƌĞĨƵƌďŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ) ?Arguably the worst of these has involved severely 
disabled residents and their families being moved into new properties with incomplete, 
non-functioning or unacceptable disability aids and adaptations, leading to a local media 
storm (Morgan, 2013).  
Residents have also raised a large number of health and safety concerns. A survey 
conducted by us in conjunction with the residents association of residents whose homes 
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had been refurbished by Rydon recorded testimonies of faulty electrical sockets and wiring,  
water leaks and major floods (Dyer et al, 2013), problems that were subsequently 
experienced in the new apartments built by Higgins (Source: email correspondence with 
residents). ZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛ KƵƚ ŽĨ ,ŽƵƌƐ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ has also been hampered by the 
wrong property database being uploaded into the computer system leading to call centre 
operators refusing to send engineers out to residents ? homes (source: correspondence from 
Rydon to residents association). In April 2014, a former Rydon employee made very specific 
allegations about health and safety breaches along with more general allegations about the 
inadequacies of contract compliance and monitoring by both Regenter and Lambeth. These 
allegations and a wider set of health and safety concerns and examples were compiled into 
a jointly-authored report between the present authors and the residents association and are 
currently being investigated by Lambeth council and the Health and Safety Executive 
(Hodkinson et al, 2014).  
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽĨ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? Ăssociation members, the fundamental problem 
underpinning these service and construction failures is that the PFI contract has diluted their 
ability to democratically hold their landlord to account. This is because the entire 
regeneration and day-to-day housing management has been contracted out and rĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?
concerns and complaints tend to be passed around different contractors without resolution. 
When residents directly seek redress from their local authority landlord, they are routinely 
directed back to the PFI consortium on the grounds that it is Regenter, and not Lambeth, 
that is now contractually responsible for the estate. While this generalised experience of 
service delivery failures under PFI arguably amounts to a form of public service and 
democratic dispossession, we now turn in more depth to three specific experiences of 
dispossession MFN residents have endured.  
 
(a) Dispossession of consumer rights: the imposition of an energy monopoly 
A central plank of the PFI scheme is the re-provision of a central Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP) plant for MFN by the energy company, E.ON. As Regenter ?Ɛ sub-contractor, E.ON is 
charged with renewing the iconic  “ĂŵďĞƌǁĞůů u^bmarine ? district heating system at the 
south-east side of the estate, which originally provided it with heat and hot water until 
disrepair led to its disconnection and replacement with individual home boilers during the 
1990s. In return, E.ON has been granted a 45 year lease on the system, giving it a long-term 
monopoly in supplying heat and hot water to all MFN residents once they are connected to 
the CHP. Residents supposedly benefit from a contractual guarantee that energy charges 
will be levied on the basis of actual use and will always be  “equivalent to or less than those 
costs that would be incurred for energy consumed if using a traditional, gas fired condensing 
boiler solution ? (Lambeth and Regenter Myatts Field North, 2012, p.340). However, 
although the CHP is potentially more energy efficient than boilers, some MFN residents 
have been less than welcoming, for two main reasons.  
First, connecting all refurbished council homes on the estate to the CHP involves the 
enforced replacement of gas cookers with standardised electrical induction hobs supplied 
by E.ON; new-build replacement homes regardless of tenure come pre-fitted with these, 
although MFN homeowners remaining in their existing homes are free to keep their gas 
connections for cooking purposes. While many residents we spoke to bemoaned the loss of 
their gas cookers, the new induction hobs have been particularly unwelcome because they 
do not work with traditional ĂƌŝďďĞĂŶ ƐƚǇůĞ  “ƵƚĐŚ ƉŽƚ ? Žƌ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ĞƚŚŶŝĐ ĐŽŽŬǁĂƌĞ. 
Lambeth has further facilitated this act of cultural dispossession by agreeing with Regenter 
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that council ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?PFI contractual right to waive particular works to their homes (so as to 
retain their own fixtures, fittings or improvements) does not cover the connection of their 
homes to the district heating system (Lambeth and Regenter Myatts Field North, 2012, p.582). A 
second grievance concerns the new hot water systems in the refurbished and new build 
homes connected to the CHP. Our surveys of residents revealed serious difficulties in 
achieving a consistent standard of heat and hot water with some having to boil kettles and 
use electric heaters. This dissatisfaction led some residents to request their own choice of 
heating and hot water supplier, only to be told this was no longer possible under the PFI 
contract. In other words, they had been dispossessed of their rights to consumer choice in a 
supposedly liberalised energy market.  
This dispossession is exemplified in human terms by the case of a disabled council 
tenant who, after being assessed by Lambeth as benefiting from retaining her gas cooker, 
was allegedly threatened with eviction by ZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌ ?
Pinnacle, if she did not allow E.ON to install an electric hob. Eventually Pinnacle backed 
down when challenged to show where the Lambeth tenancy agreement stated that tenants 
must have their energy supplied by E.ON, how tenants had been consulted about these 
changes to their housing management, and what  “reasonable adjustments ? were being 
applied under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (now Equality Act 2010). However, 
Pinnacle continued to threaten legal proceedings if the tenant obstructed E.ON ?ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ
conversion works, citing its rights of entry under LaŵďĞƚŚ ?ƐƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ.  
 
(b) Dispossession of home: the forcible acquisition of precarious owners 
A second key aspect of the MFN PFI regeneration scheme is the demolition and re-provision 
of 305 homes of which 58 are privately-owned due to the Right to Buy. We should recall 
that >ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?Ɛ decision to include and later expand private residential development as part 
of the MFN regeneration scheme was not simply about social mixing but also to generate 
the financial means to acquire these 58 homes in the first place. Lambeth had originally 
promised to enable all of these owners to stay on the estate through the option of buying 
 “an affordable 'shared ownership/equity' property in the new ďƵŝůĚ ? (Lambeth, 2006c, p.5), 
with additional support for those in financial difficulties such as a special mortgage from the 
Council or reversion to a council tenancy (Lambeth, 2007). In 2012, Pinnacle took over the 
management of rehousing existing homeowners on behalf of Lambeth, promising to assist 
anyone facing problems through liaising with their mortgage lenders, exploring shared 
ownership options and paying the costs incurred in changing or transferring their mortgage 
(Pinnacle, 2012).  
Yet, the actual lived experiences of many home owners contrast sharply with the 
official promises above. Our research identified 15 homeowners who either had or were still 
experiencing major problems in taking up WŝŶŶĂĐůĞ ?Ɛ like for like property offer because their 
existing mortgage provider or other potential lenders refused to offer a new mortgage. This 
refusal was due to ƚŚĞŚŽŵĞŽǁŶĞƌ ?Ɛfinancial circumstances or credit history representing 
too much of a risk for lenders ? post-2008 due diligence criteria. However, when 
ŚŽŵĞŽǁŶĞƌƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ WŝŶŶĂĐůĞ ?ƐCPO manager for the help they had previously been 
promised, all they received was the phone number of a mortgage broker. In fact, several 
homeowners we interviewed accused Pinnacle of actively pressuring them to voluntarily sell 
their home back to Lambeth P  “,Ğ ƚŽůĚ ƵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝĨwe waited for a CPO we would get less 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĂǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶƐĞƚ ŝŶĂ ƚƌŝďƵŶĂů ?  ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ
with leaseholder). 
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Each homeowner in this situation we interviewed talked about the extreme stress, 
the sleepless nights, and of being  “ůĞĨƚ in ůŝŵďŽ ?. Out of increasing desperation not to be 
displaced, one homeowner borrowed a large sum of money from a family friend at a high 
interest rate to pay off the mortgage and move into her like-for-like property. Two 
homeowners who had mortgage offers  “in principle ? subject to certain conditions were 
pressured by Pinnacle into vacating their home  W which was then boarded up and rendered 
uninhabitable  W and moving into a like for like property under a temporary  “licence to 
occupy ? whilst still paying the mortgage and service charge on their old home. 
Subsequently, both mortgage offers were withdrawn; in one case because the homeowner 
had not been provided with a key to her mailbox in the new property; and in the other case 
because the homeowner was unable to clear his outstanding credit card debt in time, half of 
which was owed to him by Lambeth as the result of an error in his service charge account 
that was taking months to sort out. Both homeowners are now facing eviction from the new 
homes they temporarily  “occupy ? and the compulsory purchase of their boarded-up homes. 
At the time of writing, six homeowners were still unable to move into their like for like 
property.  
The notion of accumulation by dispossession on the ground makes most sense when 
we review the data on the  “ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ ? acquisition of homes on the estate. Between May 
2012 and September 2014, 11 homes had been bought back by Pinnacle on behalf of 
Lambeth, including two homeowners with mortgage problems who did not want to sell but 
felt they had no choice due to lack of alternatives or support from Pinnacle or Lambeth. 
These 11 homeowners received between £112,000 and £255,000 (excluding compensation). 
These prices represent a huge undervaluation in relation to local property market values. In 
2012, 1-bed flats within 500 metres of MFN sold for an average of £237,230, compared to 
the £114,500 average paid by Pinnacle; and 3-bed properties sold nearby for an average of 
£478,375, compared to the £217,619 average paid by Pinnacle. Even 3-bed former council 
houses on the adjacent Myatts Field South council estate sold for an average of £315,000 in 
2013.
3
 Meanwhile, new 1, 2 and 3-bed flats for sale in the Oval Quarter development were 
being advertised on property websites in July 2014 at £360,000, £489,950 and £560,000 
respectively. Based on these prices, we estimate that the net additional land value released 
through redevelopment via dispossession of the 11 homeowners will be approximately 
£3.61 million  W or more than £328,000 per homeowner. This value will be captured by the 
various private companies engaged in assembling and developing the land as well as the 
local authority through its profit-sharing agreement, and denied to the homeowners who 
have been dispossessed even of the market value for their homes.  
These dynamics of dispossession are embodied in the story of a family we 
interviewed who had previously lived on MFN for 20 years but were unable to port their 
mortgage or get an alternative lender. Pinnacle stated that their only option left was to sell. 
Unfortunately, after accepting £200,000 less than the local market average, they were 
declared ineligible for a new shared ownership property on the estate due to insufficient 
household income. With no possibility of buying a new house in London and with no 
sustainable prospect of renting privately in the area (amounting to £2400 a month 
compared to a previous monthly mortgage repayment of under £500), the family continued 
to occupy their former home whilst negotiating with Lambeth and Regenter for support. 
After political pressure by the residents association, MP and local councillors, Lambeth and 
                                            
3
 2012 Sales data for postcodes in SW9 scraped from Zoopla.com, and 2013 data was downloaded from 
http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/market-trend-data/public-data/price-paid-data/download; 
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Regenter offered to fund 50% of a four year private sector tenancy but, according to an 
informant inside the Council, this was later withdrawn so as not to create a legal precedent 
that could benefit other households in similar situations of displacement from local 
regeneration. The family was evicted in August 2014 having been told to declare themselves 
homeless to access temporary housing, and are currently split up and living in ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?
houses with no apparent route back to their neighbourhood. 
 
(c) Dispossession of place: the virtual erasure of Myatts Field North 
A third experience of dispossession on MFN encompasses the very geographical identity of 
the estate itself. Shortly after the PFI contract began in May 2012, residents were informed 
that the new private housing development on MFN would be called  “Oval Quarter ?  ?KY). 
Using the now ubiquitous technology of Computer Generated Imagery in reimagining and 
remaking places targeted for urban regeneration, the OQ sales website succeeds in a 
complete symbolic erasure of the existing community and place by deliberate omission of 
any reference to it. An online promotional film instead emphasises easy access to the 
globally recognisable middle-class cultural highlights of central London, foregrounding 
fictional characters that are predominantly white and associating the development with the 
more affluent Oval area to its north. The website claims that the new development  “pays 
homage to the past with its traditional street patterns, the reinstatement of a lost London 
ƐƋƵĂƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ůŽĐĂů ƉĂƌŬ ?(www.ovalquarter.com). Importantly, this 
discursive dislocation and symbolic population cleansing is being physically reinforced 
through landscaping and adjustments to the MFN street layout, dissolving the old estate 
into the surrounding area:  
 
Wide public boulevards, outstanding modern architecture and seven hectares of verdant 
ƉĂƌŬůĂŶĚ ?ŝŶŽŶĞŽĨ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚcentral and convenient inner-ĐŝƚǇŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐKǀĂů
YƵĂƌƚĞƌ ? :ƵƐƚ  ? ? ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐ ďǇ ƚƵďĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů Q KǀĂů YƵĂƌƚĞƌ ŝƐ ŝĚĞĂů ĨŽƌ
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĂŶŬ ?ŽǀĞŶƚ'ĂƌĚĞŶ ?^ƚWĂƵů ?Ɛ ?dŽǁĞƌƌŝĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĂƌǇtŚĂƌĨĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ ?
To this remarkably central, yet leafy, spot  W hidden between Oval, Kennington, Camberwell and 
Stockwell  W Oval Quarter brings more than 800 homes among a series of new and beautifully 
crafted large public spaces (www.ovalquarter.com).  
 
A key driver behind this symbolic dispossession is >ŽŶĚŽŶ ?Ɛcurrent status as a lucrative 
destination for overseas investment ?ĨƵĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐŵĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇďŽŽŵĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ
the rest of the UK (Heywood, 2012). New-build residential property continues to be popular 
among Asian investors, with 48% of London investment coming from Singapore, Hong Kong, 
China and Malaysia (Gilmore, 2013). OQ was deliberately aimed at this investment market 
to generate the finance for construction through off-plan sales to investors. One of OQ ?Ɛ
development partners, Pinnacle Regeneration Group, is 61% owned by a Hong Kong-based 
investor group that is making other inroads into London residential property (Hollander, 
2012). Brixton itself is experiencing a new gentrification wave with young, middle class, and 
mainly white students and young families moving in, a radically changing high street marked 
by an exclusive  “Champagne and Fromage ? bar and some of the most rapid increases in 
property values in London, prompting a backlash against  “yuppies ? (Flyn, 2013). However, 
the marketing consultancy behind the Oval Quarter, BradleyDyer (2014), found that 
international investors were negative about MFN due to its association with the other side 
of Brixton  W its recent history of riots and crime  W and so came up with  “Oval Quarter ? 
because its association with Oval as a place helped to geographically shift the estate further 
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towards central London, making it more attractive to foreign capital (Lennon-Smith, 2014, 
p.32).  
The sense of community dispossession was brought home at a public meeting in July 
2013, when some 30 MFN residents of mixed tenure and ethnic background were played 
the promotional video. A palpable collective intake of breath was followed by head shaking, 
ĚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ĂŶĚ ĂŶŐƌǇ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂďŽƵƚ  “ŐĞŶƚƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂƐŝƚ ĚĂǁŶĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ
that OQ was in fact the virtual re-branding of their own MFN estate. MFN residents 
generally express a strong identification with Brixton due to its importance as a site of post-
war African Caribbean immigration, which, after social struggles against racism and 
discrimination that erupted in urban unrest during 1970s and 1980s, has become a vibrant if 
still deprived multi-cultural icon of London. A resident later described her concerns at a 
meeting with Lambeth and Regenter: 
 
 ? Q ?ǁŚĂƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐůŝŬĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚŝƐŶĞǁĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ W ŝĨǇŽƵůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞKǀĂůYƵĂƌƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
website  W ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƚŚŝƐŶĞǁĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐŝƚŽŶƚŽƉŽĨƚŚŝƐŽůd 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚŝƐŽůĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶƌĞĂůůǇǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? 
 
Once again, residents were not properly consulted on such a significant change to their 
ĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? thile mention of new private housing was included in the planning 
information, at no point was there any mention of the estate itself being geographically 
rebranded ŝŶƉĂƌƚŽƌǁŚŽůĞŝŶZĞŐĞŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?WůĂŶŶŝŶŐƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƌ>ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?&Ƶůů
Business Case. Instead, Lambeth emphasised improving their quality of life, through creating 
Ă  “EĞǁ DǇĂƚƚƐ ?(Lambeth, 2007). Yet tŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĚĞĐŝĚĞ ŽŶ Ă  “ĚĞƐƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ŶĂŵĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶĞǁ ďƵŝůĚ  W although not the MFN estate  W is buried in a single 
sentence in the sub-contract between Regenter and the Oval Quarter Developments Limited 
(lambeth and Regenter Myatts Field North Limited, 2012, Schedule 14, p.76). dŚŝƐ  “ůĞŐĂů ?
ĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞW&/ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇůĞĂĚƐƵƐƚŽĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌ
discussion of the role of law in facilitating dispossession on the ground. 
 
5. Assembling dispossession: some preliminary thoughts on law and place  
Throughout this account of how accumulation by dispossession becomes grounded in the 
everyday lived experiences of MFN residents, law has been lurking in the background so let 
us now bring it back into the analysis. From the perspective of legal geography scholarship, 
the work of Blomley (2004, 2008) is particularly apt here in conceptualising these processes 
of dispossession as a contemporary enclosure of local commons and collective property 
rights. While rights to choose a corporate energy supplier or enjoy private property might 
not be immediately understood in these terms, when these rights are removed for the 
material benefit of powerful corporations, they represent a modern take on the land 
expropriations of previous eras discussed in the Introduction. The displacement of 
homeowners and the virtual erasure of MFN in the place-marketing of the private OQ 
development point to another form of neighbourhood commons being dispossessed  W 
namely the imagined ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ  “ďĂƐĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ
through sustained patterns of local use and collective habitation, through ingrained 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŽĨ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? (Blomley, 2008, p.320). MFN residents have 
thus produced their local neighbourhood ? ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă  “ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ-ůŝŬĞ ĐůĂŝŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ supports 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚ ƚŽďĞ  “ĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ĨƌŽŵ ŝƚ or decisions about its identity. The fact that such 
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collective property rights are being ignored or deprived points to the need for a greater 
politicization of this by community activists and sympathetic local politicians. 
A second observation ? ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ŽŶ >ĂǇĂƌĚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ?, p.412 )  “ůĂǁ ŽĨ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ?is that 
formal legal frameworks have played an essential role in bringing MFN as a space and a 
ƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵŝƚŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ “spatial and temporal 
enclosure through conventional understandings of private property, relying on techniques 
of masterplanning, compulsory purchase, and stoppinŐ ƵƉ ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƐ ? ?Other legal rights 
have had to be overcome in the process, most notably the private property rights of 
homeowners. Ironically, it was a previous round of accumulation by dispossession through 
housing privatisation under the Right to Buy that had spread these individual private 
property rights across the estate. In response, Lambeth employed the familiar legal 
mechanisms of place-making in assembling D&E ?Ɛ publicly and privately owned property 
and land for the purpose of PFI development and contractual coherence: 
 
x producing an initial master-plan outline in 2006 that triggered Initial Demolition Notices 
ƚŽĂůůƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐƚŚƵƐƐƵƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇ “ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďƵǇ ?properties earmarked 
for demolition at large discounts that could have rendered the redevelopment 
financially untenable; 
x seeking a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) in 2007 (confirmed in June 2008) that 
allowed it to inform homeowners that their homes would be acquired either by 
agreement or compulsory purchase; 
x gaining outline planning permission in October 2007 to further enshrine the key 
regeneration principles for the future redevelopment, thus reducing the risk of the 
scheme being legally challenged at a later date by unsuccessful bidders and residents, 
and enabling competitive procurement of a PFI partner to begin;  
x serving Notices to Treat on all homeowners within the CPO area in June 2011 as a legal 
means of protecting its CPO powers after delays to the project timescales risked CPO 
expiry; and 
x signing the PFI project agreement in May 2012 as a legally binding commercial 
agreement between Lambeth and Regenter (and Regenter and its sub-contractors) that 
created the legal framework for Lambeth to relinquish large swathes of the estate under 
a 125 year lease, contracting out its management duties to this private consortium for 
 ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐĂŶĚŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞŽŶĂ “ĚĞƐƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŶĂŵĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ
private new build. 
 
However, there is a murkier side to ƚŚĞ  “ůĂǁ ŽĨ ƉůĂĐĞ ?in this housing-based scheme not 
present in >ĂǇĂƌĚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă ƌĞƚĂŝů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ that takes two particular but 
related forms. The first ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů “ĂďƵƐĞ ?ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐďǇďŽƚŚƉƵďůŝĐ
and private partners in the PFI scheme for the purpose of ensuring the project is financially 
ǀŝĂďůĞ ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ďĂƐŝƐ ĨŽƌ  ?KE ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĂƐƐĞƌƚ ŝƚƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ
over MFN residents for 45 years appears highly disputable. According to the Electricity and 
Gas (Internal Markets) Regulations of 2011, MFN tenants are entitled to connect to any 
energy supplier they prefer unless the ĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐƵƉƉůǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝƐ unable to support it 
(which it is), or doing so would lead to a severe economic impact on the landlord (which it 
might). Yet, through its PFI contract, Lambeth as landlord is denying its tenants the right to 
retain their current energy preferences through interfering with the established energy 
supply infrastructure  W a scenario that does not appear to have been anticipated in the new 
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regulations. Changing these existing arrangements would therefore place the onus on the 
landlord to carry out its statutory obligations to consult tenants and leaseholders under 
Section 105 of the Housing Act 1985 and Section 20 of the Landlord and Tenants Act 1985 
respectively. Yet we have found no evidence that any such consultation has taken place. It 
seems, rather, that the CHP plant became a fait accompli during the largely impermeable 
processes of planning and procurement and now post hoc grounds dressed in legal language 
are being used to deny tenants their previous rights for the sake of securing the profit 
streams for the PFI consortium. 
Similar to the energy issue, the legal basis of Regenter and >ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?Ɛ use of CPO 
powers to dispossess homeowners who are unable to resolve their mortgage problems also 
appears disputable. CPO regulations make it clear that homeowners who face compulsory 
purchase should be left neither better off nor worse off in material terms as a result of 
having their homes forcibly acquired. Yet as we demonstrated, some homeowners with 
mortgages are being materially disadvantaged through having to sell their devalued homes 
at sub-market prices, leave their existing neighbourhood and become private renters in 
order to stay local where the equity they had built up over the years and their affordable 
mortgage payments are replaced by very high and rising rents and all of the other problems 
that private renting in a deregulated market brings. Meanwhile, other owner occupiers who 
are mortgage free or can access refinance can transfer to the new like for like properties on 
the estate and realise a large capital gain.  
This links to the ƐĞĐŽŶĚŵƵƌŬǇĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ůĂǁŽĨƉůĂĐĞ ? ?Ŷamely, how discursive 
practices of law  W irrespective of their actual lawfulness  W are used to weaken, intimidate 
and disempower MFN residents into submission. Drawing on analyses of colonial 
dispossession, ŚĞƌĞǁĞƐĞĞůĂǁ ?Ɛ ideological power as a disciplinary technology  “wrapped in 
a specialised professional ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?  ?,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ). The PFI ĐŽŶƐŽƌƚŝƵŵ ?Ɛuncertain 
legal rights to assert its energy monopoly were de facto established through simply citing 
the existing tenancy agreement and invoking the threat of eviction should tenants seek to 
obstruct them. Similarly with respect to dispossessed homeowners, we have seen how a 
questionable  “legal ? process  W including the use of temporary licence to occupy contracts to 
facilitate vacant possession ƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽŵĞŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ ŵŽƌƚŐĂŐĞ
situations  W was complemented by simply the ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨďĞŝŶŐ “WK ?Ě ?ƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ 
sale. Following Blomley (2003, p.121), such  “ƚŚƌĞĂƚs ?ŵƵƐƚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĂnother form 
of  “ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŚĂƚhas always played  “an integral role in the legitimation, foundation, and 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌĞŐŝŵĞŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ? 
Our final observation concerns the question of legal redress. In principle, where 
there is potential abuse of the law, there is potential legal redress. The mounting evidence 
of potential legal wrongdoing has pushed some residents to engage public interest lawyers 
in preparing a legal challenge to these multiple injustices. However, in practice, as well as 
the financial costs involved, there remains an enormous obstacle to MFN residents seeking 
ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ P ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇ ďůĂĐŬ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
experience of law, lawyers and the justice system. As one black resident and community 
activist told us starkly: 
 
/ŶŵǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƚŚŝƐŝƐĂďůĂĐŬƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?tĞĨ ĂƌƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƚƌƵƐƚůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?
ǁĞǁŽŶ ?ƚrisk paying ĨŽƌůĞŐĂůŚĞůƉ ?dŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇũƵƐƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƚƌƵst the legal process after 
everything our ancestors have been through, you know, the slave trade, colonialism, racism, 
ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ QĂŶĚŶŽǁĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐǁĞĂƌĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐŝŶDǇĂƚƚƐ&ŝĞůĚEŽƌƚŚ ?(Interview with 
resident activist) 
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Conclusion  
By tracing accumulation by dispossession from above under the privatised delivery mode of 
public housing regeneration down to the lived places where regeneration happens, we have 
seen ƚŚƌĞĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĨŽƌŵƐ ĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ: the dispossession of 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƌŝŐŚƚƐthrough the creation of a corporate energy supply monopoly; the 
ĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽŵĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐŝďůĞ ĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ ŚŽŵĞŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŽŶůŝŶĞ ƌĞďranding as Oval 
Quarter.  
Behind each act is a very clear financial imperative through the PFI model to capture 
rents from land and services. For those precarious mortgaged households in particular who 
are unable to make financial arrangements to stay on the estate, we see a manifestly unjust 
and inequitable situation of home-place dispossession. Without doubt, the inaccessibility of 
mortgage finance is rooted in the toxic interplay between their personal and financial 
circumstances and the risk-averse ethos of the financial and banking sector since the 2008 
financial crisis that left MFN residents struggling to meet much stricter criteria for borrowing 
money. But this should never have been a problem for these homeowners as they already 
had mortgages and were simply swapping their existing home for a new one. It is impossible 
to escape the conclusion that a core driving factor in their experiences of active 
dispossession and displacement is Lambeth and Regenter shared financial interest in 
minimizing the overall CPO cost by under-ǀĂůƵŝŶŐ ůĞĂƐĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ŚŽŵĞƐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ
maximizing the number of like-for-like properties that can be converted to open market 
sale, through failing to help marginal leaseholders port their mortgages.  
This demonstrates how the ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ >ĂŵďĞƚŚ ?ƐPFI regeneration 
scheme  W and the crucial acquisition and rehousing of leaseholders  W depended hugely on 
further commodification, marketisation and effective enclosure of the estate, unlocking 
existing open and built space for the purpose of profit-seeking private development. 
Lambeth was from the outset allied to the needs of speculative house-building and the 
whims of the real estate market. It has opened itself aŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƵƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
turbulent, crisis-prone dynamics and contradictions of capitalist markets, a decision that has 
forcefully shaped the evolution of the scheme and the very production of space and place. 
We are also left with a powerful sense of how law  W in both a material and discursive 
sense  W has intervened in the everyday lives of MFN residents as a decisive technology of 
accumulation by dispossession. Layard ?Ɛ (2010) concept of the  “law of place ? has been 
further developed from retail schemes to housing developments to show how  legal 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐ ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ŝŶ ĞŶĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ ? ƋƵĂůůǇ
important is the ideological power of law as a discursive practice that ultimately undermines 
resistance to apparent injustices. The evidence of potential legal wrongdoing also 
represents a source of possible redress, but doubts remain as to whether residents will have 
the confidence and means to mount a legal challenge.  
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